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Article 3

Arp: The IRS's Failure to Comply

THE IRS’S FAILURE TO COMPLY: DOES
“SHALL” STILL MEAN “SHALL”?
Whitney B. Arp
INTRODUCTION
The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) routinely issues summonses to
compel taxpayers or third parties to testify and produce “any books,
papers, records or other data” relevant to an inquiry. 1 Section
7609(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code (the Code) requires that the
notice of summonses “shall be given to any person so identified
within 3 days of the day on which such service is made, but no later
than the 23rd day before the day fixed in the summons as the day
upon which such records are to be examined.”2 However, there is a
discrepancy as to whether the IRS’s failure to comply with the notice
requirement renders the summons unenforceable.3
By answering this question, a court provides a bigger picture of
whether “shall” represents a mandatory command or simply serves as
a suggestion that does not demand compliance.4 “First, shall is the
most important word of legal drafting—contracts, wills, trusts, and
the many forms of public and private legislation . . . . Shall is the
very word that is supposed to create a legal duty. Second, shall is the
most misused word in the legal vocabulary.” 5 Unfortunately, even
circuit courts have been unable to agree on the correct approach to
address this issue.6
Five circuit courts—the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuit Court of Appeals—have openly refused to enforce the

J.D. Candidate 2016, Georgia State University College of Law. I would like to thank my
parents—Rick and Angie Arp—for always pushing me to be the best person I can be.
1. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2012).
2. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012).
3. See infra note 54.
4. Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 2014) (noting that multiple circuits have
declined to enforce the twenty-three-day requirement as mandatory despite the statute’s use of the word
“shall”).
5. Joseph Kimble, The Many Misuses of Shall, 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 61, 61 (1992).
6. See Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1300.
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twenty-three day requirement as a mandatory command and upheld
the IRS’s summonses even if they were delivered after the deadline.7
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals recently decided Jewell v. United
States, which not only reinforced “shall” as a mandatory command,
but created a circuit split on the IRS’s obligation to comply with
§ 7609(a)(1). 8 This Note discusses the circuit split surrounding the
IRS’s third-party summonses, Code § 7609(a)(1)’s “shall be given”
twenty-three day notice requirement, and courts’ interpretations of
the legal term “shall.”9
Part I introduces the IRS’s summons power 10 and examines the
limits on this power imposed by Congress and the additional rules
governing third-party summons.11 Further, Part I presents the grounds
for challenging a summons, particularly the IRS’s failure to satisfy
the requirements established in United States v. Powell. 12 After
examining the requirements for the IRS to make a prima facie case
for enforcement of a summons, the issue will be narrowed to one
simple element: “[whether] the administrative steps required by the
Code have been followed.”13 Lastly, Part I discusses the controlling
precedent leading to the recent circuit split.14
Part II analyzes the divide between the circuits regarding the
application of the Powell requirements,15 some courts’ tendency to
consider the totality of the circumstances, 16 and the circuit split
7. Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013); Adamowicz v. United States, 531
F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008); Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886, 889–90 (6th Cir. 1997); Sylvestre v.
United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066
(5th Cir. 1980).
8. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1300–01.
9. See infra Part I, II, III; see also I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012).
10. See infra Part I.A.
11. See infra Part I.A; see generally I.R.C. § 7609 (2012); Brian E. Holthus, Comment, Caveat
Taxpayer: How and Why the Internal Revenue Service May Examine Your Book, Your Accountant and
Even Your Attorney, 12 PEPP. L. REV. 769, 775 (1985).
12. See infra Part I.B.
13. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964); see also infra Part I.B.
14. See infra Part I.C.
15. See infra Part II; see also Powell, 379 U.S. at 57–58.
16. See infra Part II; see also Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting
the enforcement of the summons “depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including the
seriousness of the infringement, the harm or prejudice, if any, caused thereby, and the government’s
good faith”); Robert v. United States, 364 F.3d 988, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2004) (enforcing the Circuit’s rule
“that the enforceability of a summons that the IRS issued through a violation of a law or rule depends
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created by the Tenth Circuit’s strict interpretation in Jewell v. United
States.17
Finally, Part III discusses a proposal for an agreement that the IRS
must follow the statutory requirements of the Code and a uniform
enforcement of “shall” as a mandatory command. 18 This Part
supports this proposal by discussing growing disapproval by courts
of the IRS’s failure to comply with its own Code 19 and the
importance of the interpretation of “shall” within the legal
community.20

upon all of the circumstances surrounding the summons, including the seriousness of the violation, the
government’s good faith, and the harm, if any, caused by the violation”); Cook v. United States, 104
F.3d 886, 889 (6th Cir. 1997) (employing a harmless error type analysis to conclude that a oneday late
notice did not warrant quashing the summons); Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir.
1992) (holding untimely notice was not a basis for quashing the summons where the taxpayer was not
harmed by the late notice); United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980)
(“The correct approach for determining whether to enforce a summons requires the court to evaluate the
seriousness of the violation under all the circumstances, including the government’s good faith and the
degree of harm imposed by the unlawful conduct.”).
17. Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1300 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We are hesitant to create a
circuit split, but we have little choice because we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s holding in
Powell even if other circuit courts have not.”).
18. See infra Part III.
19. See Cook, 104 F.3d at 890 (“However, this opinion must not be construed as investing the [IRS]
with a license to ignore statutory deadlines or to negligently violate other legal requirements. This court
is disturbed by a history of [IRS] irresponsibility in honoring and respecting filing requirements which
borders upon an expression of arrogant immunity from executive, legislative, and judicial mandates.”);
United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 972 n.9 (1st Cir. 1995) (“We note, too, that the Sixth Circuit
explicitly warned the IRS that it was issuing a ‘one-time only’ free pass.”); United States v. Ritchie, 15
F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We are not suggesting that the IRS may in the future avoid going
through the ex parte proceeding required by § 7609(f), for now the IRS has fair notice that if it cannot
demonstrate a bona fide interest in investigating the tax liability of the party summoned, it must comply
with § 7609(f).”); Holthus, supra note 11, at 778 (“The courts have recognized that such IRS powers are
subject to abuse. Therefore, the courts have taken it upon themselves, in party, to oversee the IRS and
protect the taxpayer from undue harassment.”).
20. See Francis A. Gilligan & Edward J. Imwinkelried, Bringing the “Opening the Door” Theory to
a Close: The Tendency to Overlook the Specific Contradiction Doctrine in Evidence Law, 41 SANTA
CLARA L. REV. 807, 831–32 n.157 (2001) (“The legislature’s use of ‘shall’ ordinarily signals a
mandatory intent.”); see also Lexecon v. Milberg Weiss Berhsad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27
(1998); Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 514 (1989); Keith v. Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190,
1193 (10th Cir. 2000); In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 619–20 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Maria, 186
F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997); Ass’n of
Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter No. 29 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 22 F.3d 1150, 1153
(D.C. Cir. 1994); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1993);
Mallory v. Mortg. Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 601, 608 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); United States v. Davis, 801
F. Supp. 581, 583 (M.D. Ala. 1992); United States v. McKenna, 791 F. Supp. 1101, 1109 (E.D. La.
1992).
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I. BACKGROUND
A. The IRS’s Summons Power
The IRS has far-reaching examination and inspection powers,
including the authority to issue a summons. 21 “Traditionally, the
IRS . . . used summonses only as a last resort after exhausting [all
other] means of obtaining information.” 22 Code § 7602 grants the
IRS summons powers for multiple purposes,23 but probable cause is
not required to support the issuance or enforcement of a summons.24
“[A] summons may be issued merely on ‘official curiosity.’” 25
Additionally, the type of information the IRS can obtain is almost
limitless.26 The IRS may issue a summons to compel a taxpayer or
third party to testify and produce “any books, papers, records or other
data” relevant or material to an inquiry.27
Not all IRS summonses are created equal.28 Summonses issued to
third parties holding financial information about the taxpayer, such as
banks, consumer reporting or credit agencies, brokers, attorneys, and
accountants, are subject to special rules. 29 A “third-party
recordkeeper” summons initiates deadlines and a procedure for
21. Holthus, supra note 11, at 771 (“The IRS has been granted far-reaching examination and
inspection powers by Congress. Such authority is not a modern development. In fact, the government
has had wide-ranging powers to examine books and witnesses since 1927.”).
22. Todd A. Izzo, The IRS Summons Power, FED. B. ASS’N SEC. TAX’N REP., Fall 1998, at 1, 2.
23. I.R.C. § 7602(a) (2012); Holthus, supra note 11, at 772 (“The IRS is given summons powers
under section 7602 for the following purposes: (1) to determine if a tax return is correct; (2) to make a
return where none has been made; and (3) to determine the tax liability of any person or the liability, at
law or in equity, of any transferee or fiduciary of that person, or to collect such liability.”).
24. IAN M. COMISKY ET AL., TAX FRAUD & EVASION ¶ 4.04[4] (2015) (“Probable cause is not
required to support the issuance or enforcement of a summons. . . . The issuance and enforcement of a
summons are not circumscribed by any civil or criminal statute of limitations.”).
25. Id. (“A summons can require the production of documents and information whether or not they
were used in the preparation of a tax return or would themselves be admissible in a judicial
proceeding.”); see also United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 51 (1964); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632, 650 (1950); United States v. Cortese, 614 F.2d 914, 915 (3d Cir. 1980); United
States v. Giordano, 419 F.2d 564, 568 (8th Cir. 1969) (comparing the IRS summons power to a
“license[] to fish”); United States v. Richards, 479 F. Supp. 828, 830 (E.D. Va. 1979).
26. Izzo, supra note 22, at 2 (The IRS can obtain almost any information in furtherance of “an
ongoing investigation to ascertain the correctness of a return, to make a return when none has been
made, to determine the liability of any person, or to collect a tax liability.”).
27. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2012).
28. COMISKY ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 4.04[4][a].
29. Id.; see also I.R.C. § 7603(b)(2) (2012).
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objection that is governed by Code § 7609. 30 First, the taxpayer
named in the summons “shall be given” notice within three days of
service on the third party and at least twenty-three days before the
examination date.31 The taxpayer then has a deadline to file a petition
to quash the summons and stop the third party’s compliance pending
judicial proceedings.32
The taxpayer under investigation may challenge the summons on
any appropriate ground, including: (1) the IRS failed to satisfy the
requirements set out in United States v. Powell; (2) the summoned
party does not have actual or constructive possession of the requested
documents; (3) the summoned party has already complied with the
summons; (4) the summoned materials are protected from disclosure;
(5) compliance with the summons would impose an unreasonable
burden on the summoned party; or (6) the summons violates a
constitutional or express statutory protection.33 The taxpayer must act
within the timeframe allotted to him under § 7609(b)(2), which is
within twenty days of receiving notice, or his right to intervene and
petition to quash the summons is lost.34
B. The Powell Standard
The IRS’s compliance, or lack thereof, with the requirements in
United States v. Powell, is the disputed issue within the context of
third party summonses. Under Powell, the summons must: (1) be
issued in an examination being conducted for a legitimate purpose;
(2) seek information relevant to that purpose; (3) seek information
not already within the IRS’s possession; and (4) satisfy all
administrative steps required by the Code.35 All four requirements are
30. COMISKY ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 4.04[4][a]; I.R.C. § 7609 (2012).
31. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012) (stating “notice of the summons shall be given to any person so
identified within 3 days of the day on which such service is made, but no later than the 23rd day before
the day fixed in the summons as the day upon which such records are to be examined”).
32. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2)(a) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other law or rule of law, any person who is
entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash
such summons not later than the 20th day after the day such notice is given in the manner provided in
subsection (a)(2).”).
33. Izzo, supra note 22, at 6; COMISKY ET AL., supra note 24, at ¶ 4.04[4][a].
34. I.R.C. § 7609(b)(2)(A) (2012).
35. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57–58 (1964) (noting that the “administrative steps
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necessary for the IRS to make a prima facie case for enforcement of a
summons, but most of the parties in the following cases agree that the
fourth prong determines whether the summons must be quashed.36
“While failure to comply with required statutory or constitutional
procedures generally renders the summons unenforceable,” this
element provides taxpayers the least amount of assistance in fighting
against summonses. 37 Courts are willing to enforce summonses
despite the IRS violating one of its own internal procedures or
guidelines, 38 and are very generous to the IRS when defining
sufficient notice. 39 For various reasons, five circuit courts rejected
petitions to quash summonses when the IRS failed to comply with
the requirements under § 7609.40

required by the Code [must] have been followed”).
36. Id.; see also Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1298 (10th Cir. 2014).
37. Izzo, supra note 22, at 6; Gerald A. Kafka, Administrative Summons: Use and Enforcement,
ST009 A.L.I. – A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC. 255, 267 (2011) (noting “[t]he fourth element of the
Powell standard, that the IRS comply with the administrative steps required by the [c]ode, has provided
the least amount of defensive comfort in opposition to a summons”).
38. Izzo, supra note 22, at 4.
39. See generally Richard B. Gallagher, Annotation, Requirement, Under 26 U.S.C.A. § 7609(a),
that Notice be Given Taxpayer of Internal Revenue Service Summons Served on Third-Party
Recordkeeper for Production of Records Relating to Business Transactions or Affairs of Taxpayer, 64
A.L.R. FED. 552 (1983); see also United States v. Hamilton Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 566 F. Supp. 755,
757–58 (E.D.N.Y. 1983) (holding the taxpayer received sufficient notice even though the notice was
mailed to taxpayer at incorrect address); United States v. Shelby State Bank, No. G78-7, 1978 WL 4512,
at *4 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 26, 1978) (ruling IRS complied with notice requirement when the record
showed the taxpayers had knowledge of the summons even though the taxpayers claimed they did not
receive such notice). But see United States v. Desert Palace, Inc., No. Civ. LV-78-263 HEC, 1979 WL
1319, at *4 (D. Nev. Mar. 12, 1979) (ruling since the taxpayer did not receive any formal notice of the
summons the court did not have personal jurisdiction over the taxpayer).
40. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1300 (“We are mindful of the fact that five other circuit courts have declined
to apply Powell in this manner.”); Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding
that Powell applied but assuming the court had equitable power to excuse the notice defect after
“evaluating the seriousness of the infraction under all the circumstances”); Adamowicz v. United States,
531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that Powell applied but assuming the court had equitable
power to excuse the notice defect if the IRS passed a “totality of the circumstances” test); Cook v.
United States, 104 F.3d 886, 889–90 (6th Cir. 1997) (holding that Powell applied but the trial courts had
discretion to “excuse the Service’s technical notification default if, and only if, the party (or parties)
entitled to statutory notification was (or were) not substantially prejudiced by the violation—that is, if
the error was harmless”); Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that
Powell applied but then failing to find that the twenty-three day requirement under section 7609(a) is an
“administrative step” required in the tax code); United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066
(5th Cir. 1980) (declining to apply Powell all together).
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C. Creating a Circuit Split
The first decision, over fifteen years after the Supreme Court
decided Powell, came from the Fifth Circuit in United States v. Bank
of Moulton.41 The Fifth Circuit emphasized the government’s good
faith and the absence of material injury to the taxpayer, rejected the
application of Powell, and justified enforcement of the summons to
avoid promoting “form over substance.” 42 Twelve years later, the
First Circuit decided Sylvestre v. United States.43 The First Circuit
held the IRS summons enforceable despite the notice falling two days
beyond the statutory provision’s requirement.44 In addition to looking
for bad faith or harm to the taxpayer, the court also considered the
purpose of the notice statute. 45 Because the taxpayer was able to
timely move to quash the summons before any records were
examined, the court felt the IRS complied with the intent of the
statute.46
In 1997, the Sixth Circuit found the summonses in Cook v. United
States enforceable despite the IRS conceding that it had technically
violated Code § 7609(a)(1). 47 The Sixth Circuit reasoned that
quashing the summonses for missing the deadline by one day was not
an “effective and efficient enforcement of the national revenue laws”
and created a “futile and pointless duplication of effort [for] the
government . . . .”48 This allowed the trial court to exercise discretion
in excusing the IRS’s technical violation if the taxpayer was not
substantially prejudiced by the violation.49 In Adamowicz v. United
States IRS, the Second Circuit followed the other circuits and
weighed the enforceability of the summons on “the totality of the
41. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d at 1063.
42. Id. at 1066.
43. Sylvestre, 978 F.2d at 25.
44. Id. at 27.
45. Id. at 28 (noting the purpose of the notice is to allow the taxpayer “the opportunity to invoke his
right to intervene and seek to quash the summons before that examination”).
46. Id.
47. Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886, 888–90 (6th Cir. 1997).
48. Id. at 889–90.
49. Id. at 889 (noting that this discretion only applies “if, and only if, the party (or parties) entitled to
statutory notification was (or were) not substantially prejudiced by the violation—that is, if the error was
harmless”) (emphasis omitted).
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circumstances, including the seriousness of the infringement, the
harm or prejudice, if any, caused thereby, and the government’s good
faith.”50 The Eleventh Circuit also came to the same conclusion in
Azis v. United States Internal Revenue Service.51
Of these five circuits, four courts acknowledge the Powell
requirement, but failed to interpret the “shall be given” notice
requirement as a mandatory command. 52 Even after evaluating
Powell, one court did not classify the twenty-three day notice
requirement to be a tax Code administrative step.53 Recognizing that
it was creating a split among circuits, the Tenth Circuit took a strict
approach to the twenty-three day notice requirement and quashed a
third-party summons because the IRS did not give the taxpayer
proper notice. 54 The Tenth Circuit classified the statutory notice
requirement as an “administrative step,” and felt obligated to apply
the Supreme Court’s Powell test. 55 Further, the court clarified the
meaning of “shall” as a mandatory intent, upholding “the age-old
precept that ‘shall’ means ‘shall.’”56
50. Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (“We see no reason to vary from
this general approach taken by our sister Circuits.”).
51. Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013) (finding the summons enforceable
“after evaluating the seriousness of the infraction under all the circumstances, including the
government’s good faith and the degree of harm imposed”).
52. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012); Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777 (holding that Powell applied but assuming
the court had equitable power to excuse the notice defect after “evaluating the seriousness of the
infraction under all the circumstances”); Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161 (holding that Powell applied but
assuming the court had equitable power to excuse the notice defect if the IRS passed a “totality of the
circumstances” test); Cook, 104 F.3d at 889–90 (holding that Powell applied but that the trial courts had
discretion to “excuse the Service’s technical notification default if, and only if, the party (or parties)
entitled to statutory notification was (or were) not substantially prejudiced by the violation—that is, if
the error was harmless”); Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992) (holding that
Powell applied but then failing to find that the twenty-three day requirement under section 7609(a) is an
“administrative step” required in the tax code).
53. Sylvestre, 978 F.2d at 28.
54. Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1300–01 (10th Cir. 2014) (“We are hesitant to create a
circuit split, but we have little choice because we are obliged to follow the Supreme Court’s holding in
Powell even if other circuit courts have not.”).
55. Id. at 1299–1300 (“In Powell, the Supreme Court did not define the term ‘administrative step.’
Thus, we start with the common meaning of the term. The term is broad, defined in one leading
dictionary as ‘[p]ertaining to, or dealing with, the conduct or management of affairs.’”).
56. Id. at 1298–99 (distinguishing Jewell from Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S. 149 (2003)
and Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010)); see also Forest Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178,
1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court and this circuit have made clear that when a statute uses the
word ‘shall,’ Congress has imposed a mandatory duty upon the subject of the command.”); United
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From this brief overview of the decisions that have addressed this
issue, it is clear that there is a divide among the circuits.57 Although
there are many judicial decisions indicating that “shall” represents a
mandatory command, 58 most circuits struggle with extending that
idea to Code § 7609(a)(1). 59 Despite their differences, it is in the
public’s best interest for courts to address this issue and send a clear
message of the court’s expectations to the IRS. 60 Although many
circuits rejected the idea of quashing the summons for “technical”
violations, the courts were not without expressed concerns.61 Some
courts quickly and directly informed the IRS that they were
successful this time, but it should not be interpreted as an acceptance
of IRS’s failure to meet deadlines. 62 In fact, some court opinions
came in the form of a warning to the IRS about future compliance.63

States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997) (“It is a basic canon of statutory construction that
use of the word ‘shall’ indicates a mandatory intent.”).
57. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1300.
58. Gilligan & Imwinkelried, supra note 20, at 831–32 n.157 (“The legislature’s use of ‘shall’
ordinarily signals a mandatory intent.”); see also Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 525
n.32 (1989); Lexecon, Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 27 (1998); Keith v.
Rizzuto, 212 F.3d 1190, 1193 n.3 (10th Cir. 2000); In re Barbieri, 199 F.3d 616, 620 (2d Cir. 1999);
United States v. Maria, 186 F.3d 65, 70 (2d Cir. 1999); United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th
Cir. 1997); Ass’n of Civilian Technicians, Mont. Air Chapter No. 29 v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 22
F.3d 1150, 1153 (D.C. Cir. 1994); Sverdrup Corp. v. WHC Constructors, Inc., 989 F.2d 148, 151 (4th
Cir. 1993); Mallory v. Mortg. Am., Inc., 67 F. Supp. 2d 601, 608 (S.D. W. Va. 1999); United States v.
Davis, 801 F. Supp. 581, 583 (M.D. Ala. 1992); United States v. McKenna, 791 F. Supp. 1101, 1109
(E.D. La. 1992).
59. See Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013); Adamowicz v. United States, 531
F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008); Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886, 889–90 (6th Cir. 1997); Sylvestre v.
United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992); United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066
(5th Cir. 1980).
60. Warren Gorham et al., CA-6, Fed Up With IRS Arrogance, Will Do Something About It–Will
Other Courts Follow Suit?, 86 J. TAX’N 382, 1997 WL 799455, at *1 (1997).
61. Cook, 104 F.3d at 888–90 (specifying that this court’s opinion does not intend to grant the IRS
“a license to ignore statutory deadlines or to negligently violate other legal requirements. This court is
disturbed by a history of [IRS] irresponsibility in honoring and respecting filing requirements which
borders upon an expression of arrogant immunity from executive, legislative, and judicial mandates.”).
62. United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We are not suggesting that the IRS
may in the future avoid going through the ex parte proceeding required by § 7609(f), for now the IRS
has fair notice that if it cannot demonstrate a bona fide interest in investigating the tax liability of the
party summoned, it must comply with § 7609(f).”); United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 972 n.9 (1st
Cir. 1995) (“We note, too, that the Sixth Circuit explicitly warned the IRS that it was issuing a ‘one-time
only’ free pass.”).
63. Cook, 104 F.3d at 890–91 (“This court shall review future violations of technical legal
requirements by the [IRS] and its agents and attorneys with an increasingly critical eye.”).
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II. THE CIRCUIT SPLIT
A. Preventing “Form Over Substance”
In the context of third-party summons, the struggle over the correct
interpretation of “shall” has been taken to a new level. Five circuit
courts have openly refused to enforce the twenty-three day
requirement as a mandatory command despite the use of “shall” in
the statute. 64 Surprisingly, the Sixth Circuit acknowledged that
“shall” is “the language of command” that reflects Congress’s
intention of “strict and nondiscretionary application of the statute.”65
Even with the acknowledgement that Congress’s intention for the
IRS to comply with the twenty-three day requirement left the IRS
“no discretionary authority” to do otherwise, the Sixth Circuit still
declined to quash the summons. 66 The court, instead, assumed
equitable power to excuse the IRS’s noncompliance with § 7609(a).67
The five circuit courts that found in favor of the IRS believe the
language of the Code, or the absence of certain language, gives the
court the power to excuse the IRS’s failure to satisfy their
obligation. 68 The Sixth Circuit points to § 7609’s absence of a
consequence for noncompliance69 as proof of Congress’s intention to
not render void every third-party summons that does not comport.70
Further, the Tenth Circuit refuses to impose sanctions where
Congress has declined to do so.71 As a result, multiple circuits held
64. Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777; Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161; Cook, 104 F.3d at 889–90; Sylvestre,
978 F.2d at 28; Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d at 1066.
65. Cook, 104 F.3d at 889 (quoting Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935)); see also sources
cited supra note 20. But see Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777; Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161; Sylvestre, 978 F.2d
at 28.
66. Cook, 104 F.3d at 889–90.
67. Cook, 104 F.3d at 889 (“A more equitable resolution would confer discretion upon the trial
courts to excuse the Service’s technical notification default if, and only if, the party (or parties) entitled
to statutory notification was (or were) not substantially prejudiced by the violation—that is, if the error
was harmless.”).
68. See, e.g., Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d at 1066 (rejecting the suggestion that “every infringement
of a requirement of the Internal Revenue Code absolutely precludes enforcement of an IRS summons”
explaining that [n]othing in the language of the [c]ode itself mandates this sanction for infringement”).
69. I.R.C. § 7609 (2012).
70. Cook, 104 F.3d at 889 (“However, Congress has not evidenced an intention to render void every
third party summons which does not comply with every technical stricture of section 7609.”).
71. Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1301 (10th Cir. 2014) (Tymkovich, J., dissenting)
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that the IRS’s failure to satisfy § 7609(a) did not require the court to
quash a third-party summons. 72
After the court determines it has the discretion to decide when to
quash a third-party summons, the next question is which test to use to
determine if the court should excuse the IRS’s violation. 73 In
determining the enforceability of the summons, the court must
evaluate the “totality of the circumstances, including the seriousness
of the infringement, the harm or prejudice, if any, caused thereby,
and the government’s good faith.” 74 In Ritchie, the Sixth Circuit
believed assessing these factors would reveal whether the summons
should be held as enforceable and prevent the promotion of form
over substance. 75 Although these courts have interpreted § 7609(a)
differently on the issue of enforceability, the Eighth and Ninth
Circuits have joined the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh
Circuits in their reading of Powell to allow for a totality of the
circumstances test in the event of a technical breach of the Code’s
administrative steps—allowing the court to use its discretion instead
of following the language of the Code.76
Evaluating whether a taxpayer is prejudiced by the IRS’s violation
is one of the most important factors courts consider.77 The purpose of
(“Where ‘a statute does not specify a consequence for noncompliance with statutory timing provisions,
the federal courts will not in the ordinary course impose their own coercive sanction.’”) (quoting United
States v. James Daniel Good Real Prop., 510 U.S. 43, 63 (1993)).
72. Azis, 522 F. App’x at 777 (decided two years ago); Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161 (decided seven
years ago); Cook, 104 F.3d at 889–90 (decided eighteen years ago); Sylvestre, 978 F.2d at 28 (decided
twenty-three years ago); Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d at 1066 (decided thirty-five years ago).
73. See, e.g., Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161.
74. Id.; see also Robert v. United States, 364 F.3d 988, 996–97 (8th Cir. 2004) (holding the IRS’s
violation depends on “all of the circumstances surrounding the summons, including the seriousness of
the violation, the government’s good faith, and the harm, if any, caused by the violation”); Bank of
Moulton, 614 F.2d at 1066 (finding the enforceability of a summons requires the court to evaluate “the
seriousness of the violation under all the circumstances, including the government’s good faith and the
degree of harm imposed by the unlawful conduct”).
75. United States v. Richey, 632 F.3d 559, 565 (9th Cir. 2011).
76. See Richey, 632 F.3d at 565 (finding “substantial compliance with . . . service requirements”
sufficient if the IRS acts in good faith and the taxpayer is not prejudiced); Robert, 364 F.3d at 996–97
(“Our approach, however, was not to adopt a per se rule and hold unenforceable all summonses that
involve a violation of a rule or law.”).
77. Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886, 890 (6th Cir. 1997) (“This court stresses that it rules only
that the district courts possess discretionary authority to excuse the Service’s technical notice errors
where the party in interest suffered no actual prejudice”).
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§ 7609(a)’s twenty-three day requirement is to allow taxpayers the
opportunity to invoke their right to intervene and seek to quash the
summons before the third-party action is taken.78 As a result, courts
consistently deem the IRS’s error harmless when taxpayers are not
precluded from filing their motion to quash the summons before the
third-party production occurs.79 The court reasons that if taxpayers
are able to file the petition to quash in a timely manner, the taxpayers
receive every benefit due to them under § 7609(a).80
All five circuit courts—the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits—also consider whether the government has acted
in good faith.81 Unfortunately for the taxpayer, it has proven difficult
to show bad faith when the IRS only misses the deadline by a few
days and the taxpayer is still able to timely file a petition to quash.82
Even the IRS’s acknowledgment that it did not comport with the
twenty-three day requirement falls short of proving bad faith.83
Even though the court evaluates the “totality of the circumstances”
when determining the enforceability of a third-party summons, policy
reasons appear to play a large role in the decisions of these five
circuit courts.84 Without specifically stating a preference for the IRS,
the circuit courts have reflected on the Supreme Court’s
recommendation to “be slow to erect barriers to enforcement of IRS
78. Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992).
79. Cook, 104 F.3d at 888 (“The [taxpayers] have conceded that they suffered no actual prejudice as
a consequence of the delayed notice, as they were able to initiate their petition to quash the summons in
a timely manner and prior to the date of compliance commanded by the summons.”).
80. Sylvestre, 978 F.2d at 28 (finding the taxpayer complied with the purpose of the notice
requirement under section 7609 when he timely moved to quash the summonses before the examination
of the documents, even though the taxpayer received his notice twenty-one, rather than twenty-three,
days before the date set for examination).
81. Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013) (holding the IRS offered a good faith
reason for not complying with the 7609(a) requirement when the IRS employee “was unable to fax the
attachments because he was out of town for training”); Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 162
(2d Cir. 2008) (finding no bad faith when taxpayers produced “no evidence from which [the court]
could conclude that the IRS acted in bad faith”); Cook, 104 F.3d at 888 (finding no bad faith despite the
IRS conceding that it technically violated section 7609(a)(1) by mailing the notice one day late);
Sylvestre, 978 F.2d at 28 (“We find no reason to suspect bad faith in the two day shortfall in notice.”).
82. Sylvestre, 978 F.2d at 28.
83. Cook, 104 F.3d at 888 (“The [IRS] has conceded that it technically violated section 7609(a)(1)
by mailing statutory notice to the Cooks on March 30, 1995, one day following the close of the
legislatively mandated notification period.”).
84. See, e.g., Adamowicz, 531 F.3d at 161.
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summonses where the summonses are being used to further the
IRS[‘s] mission of effectively investigating taxpayer liabilities.” 85
Because a decision to quash the summons would result in the IRS
having to reissue the summons to the third party and the taxpayer,
courts have expressed concern with the efficiency of such a ruling.86
This concern is exacerbated when the IRS has missed the deadline
for compliance by a very short amount of time.87
The preceding factors led the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits to believe that forcing the IRS to comply with the
“shall” language in the twenty-three day notice requirement of
§ 7609(a) would be a gross elevation of “form over substance.”88
B. “Shall” as a Mandatory Command
1. Jewell v. United States
In April 2014, the Tenth Circuit heard the case of Jewell v. United
States regarding four IRS summonses that were issued to banks
requesting information about taxpayer Sam T. Jewell.89 When Jewell
received his summonses less than twenty-three days before the
records were to be examined, he filed petitions to quash the
summonses for inadequate notice.90 The IRS admitted that Jewell had
not received the statutory notice he was entitled to under

85. Robert v. United States, 364 F.3d 988, 996 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing United States v. Euge, 444
U.S. 707, 711 (1980)).
86. Cook, 104 F.3d at 889 (“Given the public interest at stake in effective and efficient enforcement
of the national revenue laws, this court will not impute such an intention to Congress in the absence of a
clear legislative statement.”); United States v. Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1994) (explaining “it
would exalt form over substance to make the IRS go through the motions of having an ex parte court
proceeding, getting the summons issued, serving it, defending a motion to quash, and filing a motion for
enforcement, all to bring us back to where we are now”).
87. Cook, 104 F.3d at 890 (holding that requiring the IRS to reissue the summons after missing the
deadline by one day is a “futile and pointless duplication of effort by the government, the attendant
waste of public resource and those of the [third-party], and the concomitant delay of a criminal
investigation which would flow from a rigid formal adherence to statutory notification requisites
divorced from the realities of the particular case.”).
88. See Ritchie, 15 F.3d at 600; United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir.
1980).
89. Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1297 (10th Cir. 2014)
90. Id.
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§ 7609(a)(1). 91 This left the Tenth Circuit with the question of
“whether [the court was] free to disregard the statutory requirement
of [twenty-three] days’ notice.”92 This, of course, was a question that
five other circuit courts had already answered.93
The Tenth Circuit evaluated this case under Powell’s four
requirements to make a prima facie case for enforcement of an
administrative summons.94 Both Jewell and the IRS agreed the fourth
prong of Powell—that “the IRS must have followed the
‘administrative steps required by [the Internal Revenue Code]’”—
determined whether the summonses must be quashed. 95 The court
concluded the meaning of the term “administrative” is broad and left
undefined by the Supreme Court but would definitely include the sort
of “technical requirement” that § 7609(a) offers.96
The Tenth Circuit also evaluated § 7609(a)’s use of the word
“shall” and what obligation it imposed on the IRS.97 The court began
by finding that the Tenth Circuit repeatedly interpreted “shall” to
indicate a mandatory intent.98 Further, the court rejected the IRS’s
argument that “shall” does not always signify a mandatory
command.99 The court concluded that this issue “did not disturb the
age-old precept that ‘shall’ means ‘shall.’”100 Thus, the language of
§ 7609(a)(1), stating that the notice of summonses “shall be given” at

91. Id. at 1298.
92. Id.
93. See supra Part II.A.
94. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1297.
95. Id. at 1297–98.
96. Id. at 1299–1300.
97. Id. at 1298.
98. Id. (“It is a basic canon of statutory construction that use of the word ‘shall’ indicates a
mandatory intent.” (quoting United States v. Myers, 106 F.3d 936, 941 (10th Cir. 1997))); Forest
Guardians v. Babbitt, 174 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 1999) (“The Supreme Court and this circuit have
made clear that when a statute uses the word ‘shall,’ Congress has imposed a mandatory duty upon the
subject of the command.”).
99. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1298–99 (distinguishing Jewell from Barnhart v. Peabody Coal Co., 537 U.S.
149 (2003) and Dolan v. United States, 560 U.S. 605 (2010) because the IRS had the choice to issue the
summonses but was not required to do so, where in Barnhart that choice was not available to the Social
Security Commissioner; and in Dolan, that choice was not available to the sentencing court).
100. Id. at 1299.
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least twenty-three days before the date of the examination, imposes a
mandatory command for the IRS to follow.101
After finding the twenty-three day notice requirement mandatory
and an “administrative step,” the Tenth Circuit applied the Powell
factors to conclude that the IRS cannot make a prima facie showing
for enforcement of the summonses in this case.102 Because the IRS
admits to not complying with the twenty-three day requirement,
Powell prevents the enforcement of the summonses. 103 The Tenth
Circuit made this decision despite five circuits finding the opposite
way. 104 The Tenth Circuit stated, “[t]hough we do not lightly create a
circuit split, we are obliged to follow Supreme Court precedent, even
when it might be viewed as ‘inequitable’ or as ‘form over
substance.’”105
2. The Disintegration of “Shall”
Although the Tenth Circuit did not explore policy reasons to
support the decision in Jewell, there are multiple concerns that
further the court’s argument. 106 First, the five circuit courts that
refused to enforce the twenty-three day requirement as a mandatory
command contributed to the confusion surrounding the meaning of
“shall” in a legal context. Second, the word “shall” has been “so
corrupted by misuse that it has become inherently ambiguous. It
should mean ‘must,’ but too often it’s used to mean or interpreted to
mean ‘should’ or ‘may.’”107
This evolved into such a problem in the legal community that in
2006, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure recognized
“shall” as an “inherently ambiguous word[]” and recommended
restyling the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to “replace ‘shall’ with
101. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012); Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1299.
102. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1300.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. See CA-6, Fed Up With IRS Arrogance, Will Do Something About It–Will Other Courts Follow
Suit?, supra note 60, at 2.
107. Joseph Kimble, Lessons in Drafting from the New Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 12 SCRIBES
J. LEGAL WRITING 25, 79 (2009).
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‘must,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on which one the context and
established interpretation make correct in each rule.” 108 Many
legislatures sent a clear message to courts regarding the interpretation
of “may” and “shall” by including these words in the definition
sections of codes 109 or by passing laws dictating how to construe
statutes.110 Only ten states took the time to define “may” and “shall”
through legislation,111 but no state passed a statute undermining the
distinction between these two words.112
3. A History of IRS Irresponsibility
Courts have recognized that the IRS’s powers are subject to abuse
and have found it necessary to oversee the IRS to protect the
taxpayer.113 One of the ways the taxpayer is protected is by statute,
but this safeguard only works if the court is willing to enforce it.114
Another concern favoring a strict enforcement of § 7609 is the risk of
108. See Advisory Comm. on Fed. Rules of Civil Procedure, Report of the Civil Rules Advisory
Committee, at D-8 (2006), http://search.uscourts.gov/search?utf8=%E2%9C%93&affiliate=uscourts.gov
&query=%22correct+in+each+rule%22.
109. Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO. L.J. 341, 359
(2010); see also, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(26), (39) (West 2014).
110. Scott, supra note 109, at 359; see also, e.g., LA. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2014).
111. IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.1(30) (West 2014) (“a. The word ‘shall’ imposes a duty. b. The word
‘must’ states a requirement. c. The word ‘may’ confers a power.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(39)
(West 2014) (“‘Shall’ is mandatory”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2014) (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory
and the word ‘may’ is permissive.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 71(9-A) (2014) (“‘Shall’ and ‘must’
are terms of equal weight that indicate a mandatory duty, action or requirement. ‘May’ indicates
authorization or permission to act.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.44(16) (West 2014) (“‘Shall’ is
mandatory.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-802(1) (West 2014) (“When the word may appears,
permissive or discretionary action is presumed. When the word shall appears, mandatory or ministerial
action is presumed.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 0.025(d) (West 2014) (“‘Shall’ imposes a duty to act.”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-4 (West 2014) (“A. ‘Shall’ and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation,
requirement or condition precedent. B. ‘May’ confers a power, authority, privilege or right. C. ‘May
not’, ‘must not’ and ‘shall not’ prohibit the exercise of a power, authority, privilege or right.”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-2.1 (2014) (The term shall “manifests a mandatory directive and does not confer
any discretion in carrying out the action so directed.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.016(2) (West
2013) (“‘Shall’ imposes a duty.”).
112. Scott, supra note 109, at 359–60.
113. Holthus, supra note 11, at 778 (“The courts have recognized that such IRS powers are subject to
abuse. Therefore, the courts have taken it upon themselves, in part, to oversee the IRS and protect the
taxpayer from undue harassment.”).
114. Id. (“The taxpayer is also protected by statute. For example, the IRS may not enforce its own
summons. If a taxpayer refuses to comply with the summons, the IRS must look to the court for
enforcement.”).
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having an IRS with broad powers and a court that refuses to restrain
those powers.
Evidence suggests that the IRS’s efforts to comply with deadlines
continues to decline, leaving some in the legal community “fed up
with IRS arrogance.”115 Even among the five circuit courts declining
to enforce the twenty-three day requirement, the Sixth Circuit was
“disturbed by a history of [IRS] irresponsibility in honoring and
respecting filing requirements—which borders upon an expression of
arrogant immunity from executive, legislative, and judicial
mandates.”116
There is a growing concern that the IRS will interpret the five
circuit courts’ decisions as justification or approval of the IRS’s
behavior.117 Even though a few courts issued warnings to the IRS
about future violations118 or promised to “review future violations of
technical legal requirements by the [IRS] and its agents and attorneys
with an increasingly critical eye,”119 there is reason to believe that the
115. CA-6, Fed Up With IRS Arrogance, supra note 60, at 2.
116. Cook v. United States, 104 F.3d 886, 890 (6th Cir. 1997) (finding a “disconcerting pattern of
inexcusable neglect by the Service and its attorneys in discharging legally mandated obligations”):
Pursuant to a stipulation by the parties, a magistrate judge extended the time for
the government’s reply to the Cooks’ April 18, 1995 petition to quash the
summons, accompanied by the proviso that “no further extension will be
granted.” Although the magistrate set June 29, 1995 as the response deadline, the
Service, without a timely motion for an extension, did not attempt to file its
purported opposition (a Motion to Dismiss the petition) until June 30, 1995. The
district court rejected this filing on July 6, 1995 because it violated Local Rule
24(c) of the United States District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
which requires the submission of an original plus one copy of all filings. The
[IRS] did not correct its procedural error until July 12, 1995. Although default
was entered against the government on August 14, 1995, the district court on
August 18, 1995 set aside that default on the rationale that the petitioners had not
been prejudiced by the Service’s delay. In the court of appeals, the government
filed its appellee’s brief one day late.
Id.
117. Id. (“However, this opinion must not be construed as investing the [IRS] with a license to ignore
statutory deadlines or to negligently violate other legal requirements.”).
118. United States v. Gertner, 65 F.3d 963, 972 n.9 (1st Cir. 1995) (“We note, too, that the Sixth
Circuit explicitly warned the IRS that it was issuing a ‘one-time only’ free pass.”); United States v.
Ritchie, 15 F.3d 592, 600 (6th Cir. 1994) (“We are not suggesting that the IRS may in the future avoid
going through the ex parte proceeding required by § 7609(f), for now the IRS has fair notice that if it
cannot demonstrate a bona fide interest in investigating the tax liability of the party summoned, it must
comply with § 7609(f).”).
119. Cook, 104 F.3d at 890–91.
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First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuits have no intention of
acting on those threats.120
Instead, the courts continue to only hold the IRS accountable to the
Code if the court can find the IRS acted in bad faith or the taxpayer
was prejudiced. 121 Even this evaluation of the “totality of the
circumstances” seems to favor the IRS because the court is often
willing to find a valid good faith reason for noncompliance.122 For
example, the court found a good faith reason for not complying with
a statutory requirement when one IRS agent testified he was unable
to fax the attachments and missed the deadline because he was out of
town for training.123 Similarly, it has proven difficult for a taxpayer
to show he or she suffered prejudice. If a taxpayer is able to file the
petition to quash in a timely manner, the court believes the taxpayer
received every benefit due to him under § 7609(a).124 The “totality of
the circumstances” test reveals a bias for the IRS that results in the
IRS getting a free pass when they fail to comply with the Code.
III. PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court, or circuit courts themselves, should reconcile
this circuit split by joining the Tenth Circuit’s attempt to take back
the meaning of “shall.” When the court comes across language that
some action “shall” be dealt with in a certain way, it must be
interpreted as a “language of command.” 125 By restoring the
mandatory requirement that “shall” carries, the court has no
120. See Boyd v. United States, 87 F. App’x 481, 485 (6th Cir. 2003) (“The decision in Cook sternly
warned the IRS that procedural requirements should be taken seriously. . . . However, because the
plaintiffs have not demonstrated any actual or even possible prejudice . . . we reject the plaintiffs’
invitation to use this case to teach the IRS a lesson.”).
121. Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting the enforcement of the
summons “depends upon the totality of the circumstances, including the seriousness of the infringement,
the harm or prejudice, if any, caused thereby, and the government’s good faith”).
122. Id. at 161.
123. Azis v. U.S. IRS, 522 F. App’x 770, 777 (11th Cir. 2013).
124. Sylvestre v. United States, 978 F.2d 25, 28 (1st Cir. 1992) (finding the purpose of the notice
requirement under § 7609 was complied with when the taxpayer timely moved to quash the summonses
before the examination of the documents, even though the taxpayer received his notice twenty-one,
rather than twenty-three, days before the date set for examination).
125. Escoe v. Zerbst, 295 U.S. 490, 493 (1935).
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discretion to interpret different meanings of “shall” which have
traditionally resulted in different outcomes.
Within tax law, this means that if the IRS does not comply with
the twenty-three day requirement established by § 7609(a)(1), the
court must find a summons unenforceable.126 A summons should be
unenforceable, regardless of whether the IRS acted in good faith or a
taxpayer was prejudiced in any way. The “totality of the
circumstances” does not need to be considered because if the court
applies the original meaning of “shall,” no other discretion or
consideration is required. 127 Although this interpretation of “shall”
directly affects the enforceability of summonses under § 7609(a)(1),
this issue also applies to a greater picture well beyond tax law.128
The underlying problem bringing this tax issue before courts is the
misuse and abuse of “shall” in legal writing. “Drafters use it
mindlessly. Courts read it any which way . . . . shall has lost its
modal meaning—for drafters and for courts.”129 Legal commentators
are starting to wonder if “we might better try something new.”130 To
further prevent the misuse of “shall,” courts should always read
“shall” with a strict interpretation, as a mandatory command. If the
courts continue to be troubled by “shall’s” mandatory intent and lack
of discretion left for the court, the best action is to either clearly and
uniformly define “shall” or replace it with a more appropriate term
like “must,” “may,” or “should.”131
A. The Problem: Must, May, or Should?
At first glance, it appears that many courts are supportive of a
movement towards a broader interpretation of “shall.” 132
126. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012).
127. Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008).
128. Entitlement to Notice, 6 BANKR. SERVICE , LAW. ED. § 53:64 (2014) (“Use of the word ‘shall’ in
the bankruptcy rule governing the transfer of claims indicates that Congress considered the filing of
notice of transfer of claim to be mandatory; the plain and ordinary meaning of ‘shall’ is mandatory, not
precatory.”).
129. Kimble, supra note 5, at 71.
130. Id.
131. See infra Part III.C.
132. Lomelo v. Mayo, 204 So. 2d 550, 552 (Fla. 1967) (holding that although “shall” normally has a
mandatory connotation, it may in proper cases, be construed as permissive only).

Published by Reading Room, 2016

19

Georgia State University Law Review, Vol. 32, Iss. 3 [2016], Art. 3

692

GEORGIA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 32:3

Unfortunately, this is a shift in the wrong direction and contributes to
the overall problem. “It’s like a disease. The word ‘shall’ has spread
like woodworm. Its improper use has so penetrated legal documents
as to make them unreliable.” 133 To begin, there are too many
interpretations of “shall,” and the First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and
Eleventh Circuits are not the only courts involved in this
confusion.134 Accepting this as a problem is a crucial step rather than
assuming the court has the discretion to determine the meaning of
“shall” within the context of each case.
Whether it is “must,” “may,” or “should,” the multiple
interpretations have caused an ambiguity surrounding the word
“shall” to the extent that it has arguably lost all meaning. The result is
courts fail to uphold requirements that Congress may have intended
to be mandatory, such as § 7609(a)(1).
B. The Importance: Beyond Tax Law
“First, shall is the most important word of legal drafting—
contracts, wills, trusts, and the many forms of public and private
legislation . . . . Shall is the very word that is supposed to create a
legal duty. Second, shall is the most misused word in the legal
vocabulary.” 135 Coming to a solution in regards to the misuse of
“shall” is a very important issue for many reasons.
As referenced above, multiple interpretations of “shall” are a
problem because some outcomes are not consistent with the drafter’s
original purpose for using “shall.” Further, the lack of one established
meaning causes clarity and uniformity issues. By accepting “shall” as
a mandatory command, the court will bring clarity and uniformity to
133. David C. Elliott, Writing Agreements in Plain Language, 49 DISP. RESOL. J. 73, 77 (1994).
134. People v. Adams, 99 Cal. Rptr. 122, 124 (1971) (finding “absent unusual circumstances” “shall”
imports compulsory action, but in penal law, “construction which is more favorable to [the] offender
will be adopted”); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Ed., 289 A.2d 914, 918 (Conn. 1971) (holding a provision
in a statute stating certain courses “shall” be prepared should be interpreted as the courses “may” be
prepared); Bochantin v. Petroff, 198 Ill. App. 3d 369, 374 (1990) (finding although “may” usually
implies discretion, it may be construed as “shall” if necessary to carry out legislative intent or when
rights of third-persons are involved); Kessler v. Hunter, 280 N.Y.S.2d 474, 475 (1967) (holding “shall”
is not always mandatory and may be merely directive).
135. Kimble, supra note 5, at 61.
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the interpretation of this word. Under the current situation, a taxpayer
enjoys very little predictability regarding whether a court will find
the IRS’s summons enforceable.
C. The Solution: Leaving No Discretion
1. Define “Shall”
Clarity and uniformity of the interpretation of “shall” is possible
by removing discretion. This means that the definition of “shall”
needs to be so completely clear and widely accepted that there is no
reason to question whether it is a mandatory or persuasive
command. 136 Many legislatures have already acknowledged the
importance of this step, and are taking action to correct this issue.137
Legislatures have attempted to guide courts in how to interpret “may”
and “shall” by including these words in the definition section of
Codes138 or by passing laws dictating how to construe statutes.139 Ten
states have already defined “may” and “shall” through legislation,140
136. Steven S. Gensler, Must, Should, Shall, 43 AKRON L. REV. 1139, 1145 (2010) (“One way of
solving both the ‘slipperiness’ and the ‘promiscuity’ problems would have been to give ‘shall’ a single
meaning and then strictly confine the usage of ‘shall’ to that single meaning.”).
137. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.1(30) (West 2014); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(39) (West 2014);
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2014); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 71(9-A) (2014); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 645.44(16) (West 2014); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-802(1) (West 2014); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 0.025(d) (West 2014); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-4 (West 2014); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-2.1
(2014); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.016(2) (West 2013).
138. Scott, supra note 109, at 359; see also, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(20)(39) (West
2014).
139. Scott, supra note 109, at 359; see also, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2014).
140. IOWA CODE ANN. § 4.1(30) (West 2014) (“a. The word ‘shall’ imposes a duty. b. The word
‘must’ states a requirement. c. The word ‘may’ confers a power.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 446.010(39)
(West 2014) (“‘Shall’ is mandatory.”); LA. STAT. ANN. § 1:3 (2014) (“The word ‘shall’ is mandatory
and the word ‘may’ is permissive.”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 71(9-A) (2014) (“‘Shall’ and ‘must’
are terms of equal weight that indicate a mandatory duty, action or requirement. ‘May’ indicates
authorization or permission to act.”); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 645.44(16) (West 2014) (“‘Shall’ is
mandatory.”); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-802(1) (West 2014) (“When the word may appears,
permissive or discretionary action is presumed. When the word shall appears, mandatory or ministerial
action is presumed.”); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 0.025(d) (West 2014) (“‘Shall’ imposes a duty to act.”);
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 12-2A-4 (West 2014) (“A. ‘Shall’ and ‘must’ express a duty, obligation,
requirement or condition precedent. B. ‘May’ confers a power, authority, privilege or right. C. ‘May
not’, ‘must not’ and ‘shall not’ prohibit the exercise of a power, authority, privilege or right.”); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 2-14-2.1 (2014) (The term shall “manifests a mandatory directive and does not confer
any discretion in carrying out the action so directed.”); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 311.016(2) (West
2013) (“‘Shall’ imposes a duty.”).
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and no state has passed a statute undermining the distinction between
these two words.141
Even after defining “shall,” uniformity can still present an issue,
especially if sources allow for multiple definitions. For example,
Black’s Law Dictionary offers five different definitions for “shall.”142
Most importantly, the first definition states “[h]as a duty to; more
broadly, is required to . . . . This is the mandatory sense that drafters
typically intend and that courts typically uphold.”143 Ballentine’s Law
Dictionary begins by defining “shall” as “a word of mandate, the
equivalent of ‘must’” but also strays away from this strict
interpretation by further explaining that “shall” can mean “may” or
be “merely directory when no advantage is lost, when no right is
destroyed, when no benefit is sacrificed, either to the public or to any
individual, by giving that construction.”144 With both dictionaries, the
first definition given is consistent with the traditional meaning of
“shall,” but the additional definitions leave room for discretion,
which prevents uniformity.
2. Abolish “Shall”
An alternative to defining “shall” is to simply do away with the
word completely. “The cure to addiction is abstinence. Don’t use the
word at all. Remove all ambiguity. Replace every ‘shall’ with ‘must.’
If the sentence does not ‘read right’ ‘shall’ was the wrong word to
use.” 145 There are three main arguments for banning the use of
“shall” rather than defining the word. First, the use of “shall” is rare

141. Scott, supra note 109, at 359–60.
142. Shall, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009).
1. Has a duty to; more broadly is required to . . . This is the mandatory sense that
drafters typically intend and that courts typically uphold. 2. Should (as often
interpreted by courts) . . . 3. May . . . When a negative word such as not or no
precedes shall (as in the example in angle brackets), the word shall often means
may. What is being negated is permission, not a requirement. 4. Will (as a futuretense verb) . . . 5. Is entitled to . . .
Id. (emphasis omitted).
143. Id.
144. Shall, BALLENTINE’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2010).
145. Elliott, supra note 133, at 78.
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outside of the legal community.146 Second, the “slipperiness” of the
word resulted in its extreme misuse and has been “so corrupted [] that
the old usage habits would be so hard to break [] that the only
effective solution [is] to stop using ‘shall’ altogether.” 147 Lastly,
some believe eliminating “shall” is the only option because they fear
the court will still interpret the meaning of “shall” by the context
regardless of what the definition section of codes dictate.148
If the legal community removes “shall” completely, there must be
a word or multiple words to replace “shall.” Determining the correct
word to replace “shall” could be difficult in certain situations,
especially when the original intent is not clear, but general categories
give some direction. For example, “must” could replace “shall” when
“shall” was being used for its traditional purpose to impose a
mandatory obligation, duty, or direction. 149 “Will” could replace
“shall” when “shall” was being used for “the simple future,” and
“may” when “shall” allowed discretion.150
In 2006, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
recommended restyling the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP)
to “replace ‘shall’ with ‘must,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should,’ depending on
which one the context and established interpretation make correct in
each rule.”151 In total, the FRCP contained nearly 500 “shalls.”152 Of
the 500, “must” replaced “shall” 375 times. 153 The Committee
eliminated the remaining 125 “shalls” through “tightening of the rule
language, conver[sion] to present-tense verbs, or translat[ion] to
146. Michele M. Asprey, Shall Must Go, 3 SCRIBES J. LEGAL WRITING 79, 79 (1992) (“Using shall
puts lawyers out of step with the language of the general community; nonlawyers don’t understand the
special way lawyers use shall in documents and laws.”).
147. Gensler, supra note 136, at 1145; see also Asprey, supra note 146, at 79 (“Lawyers misuse it.
They confuse the imperative shall with the future tense and fail to distinguish between the various
senses of shall in their documents.”).
148. Asprey, supra note 146, at 81 (“None of these plain-language words has a meaning that is set in
stone—in law, or anywhere else. The meaning will always be governed to a great extent by the
context.”).
149. Id. at 79 (“Must for the imperative shall—whether we want to impose an obligation or a duty, or
make a direction, whether or not we do it by contract or statute, and regardless of what the penalty is.”).
150. Id.
151. Gensler, supra note 136, at 1147 n. 43 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 1 advisory committee’s note to
2007 amendment.)
152. Gensler, supra note 136, at 1147.
153. Id.
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different modal verbs like ‘will,’ ‘may,’ or ‘should.’” 154 This is a
good example of the legal community taking progressive steps
toward fixing a problem that affects many different areas of the law.
CONCLUSION
The IRS has summons powers to compel a taxpayer or third party
to testify and produce “any books, papers, records or other data”
relevant or material to an inquiry. 155 Section 7609(a)(1) of the
Internal Revenue Code requires that the notice of summonses “shall
be given to any person so identified within 3 days of the day on
which such service is made, but no later than the 23rd day before the
day fixed in the summons as the day upon which such records are to
be examined.”156
The First, Second, Fifth, Sixth, and Eleventh Circuit Court of
Appeals found that a court has the discretion to excuse the IRS’s
failure to comply with the twenty-three day requirement if the
taxpayer was not prejudiced and the IRS acted in good faith.157 The
Tenth Circuit rejected this approach in Jewell, and found the
summons unenforceable when the IRS did not meet the twenty-three
day requirement. 158 Holding that “‘shall’ means ‘shall,’” the Tenth
Circuit believed the mandatory command left no room for
discretion.159
Jewell created a circuit split, which brought a growing problem
into the spotlight; the misuse of “shall.” The five circuit courts
believe the broader interpretation of “shall” prevents the promotion
of “form over substance,” but this has resulted in ambiguity and the
court’s failure to uphold requirements of the IRS. 160 The Tenth
154. Id.
155. I.R.C. § 7602(a)(1) (2012).
156. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(1) (2012).
157. Adamowicz v. United States, 531 F.3d 151, 161 (2d Cir. 2008) (examining “totality of the
circumstances, including the seriousness of the infringement, the harm or prejudice, if any, caused
thereby, and the government’s good faith”).
158. Jewell v. United States, 749 F.3d 1295, 1301 (10th Cir. 2014).
159. Id. at 1299, 1301.
160. United States v. Bank of Moulton, 614 F.2d 1063, 1066 (5th Cir. 1980).
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Circuit’s strict interpretation of “shall” as a mandatory command
promotes clarity, uniformity, and predictability.
To further prevent the misuse of “shall,” courts should follow the
Tenth Circuit’s decision. If the courts continue to be troubled by the
mandatory intent and lack of discretion associated with “shall,” the
best action is for legislatures to either clearly and uniformly define
“shall” or replace it with a more appropriate term like “must,” “may,”
or “should.” Until then, the court should refrain from “disturb[ing]
the age-old precept that ‘shall’ means ‘shall.’”161

161. Jewell, 749 F.3d at 1299.
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